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Abstract
In this paper non-classical logical techniques are introduced to formalize the analysis
of multi-interpretable observation information, in particular in approximate classiﬁca-
tion processes where information on attributes of an object is to be inferred on the basis
of observable properties of the object. One frequently occurring reason for imperfect
classiﬁcation is when the available observations are insuﬃcient to determine unique
values for each of the attributes: a range of values may still be possible. Another often
occurring reason for imperfect classiﬁcation occurs when the observation information is
contradictory: for some of the attributes not any value is possible. The combination of
both types of imperfection is non-trivial from a standard logical perspective. To address
this problem multi-interpretation operators and selection operators are introduced;
these techniques generalize non-monotonic reasoning formalisms such as default logic.
A speciﬁc multi-interpretation operator for approximate classiﬁcation is introduced and
formally analysed. On the basis of this approach, in co-operation with industry a system
has been designed and implemented for the analysis of ecological monitoring infor-
mation.
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1. Introduction
In most real-life situations humans receive information that can be inter-
preted in many diﬀerent ways. On the one hand this involves interpretation:
the information from the outside world has to be given a meaning. In logic
the notion of interpretation mapping has been introduced to describe the in-
terpretation of one logical theory in another logical theory, for example ge-
ometry in algebra (cf. Chapter 5 in [7]). This notion assumes a choice for one
interpretation, and does not cover cases in which multiple interpretations at
the same time are relevant. But on the other hand, given the information
received, there is often more than one possibility for forming a set of beliefs
about the world. This can be due to incompleteness, vagueness or uncertainty
of the input, and may require non-monotonic reasoning techniques of the
reasoning agent. The context often determines the view with which this in-
formation is interpreted. In this paper multi-interpretation operators are in-
troduced and applied to formalize multiple interpretations of observation
information. The notion of a multi-interpretation operator is rather general:
it subsumes on the one hand the notion of interpretation in logic, and on the
other hand the notion of (non-monotonic) belief set operator as introduced
in [5].
A speciﬁc type of multi-interpretation operator is deﬁned to interpret ob-
servation information in approximate classiﬁcation tasks. The generic task
formalized by such an operator is as follows. Suppose there is an object in the
world, and one is interested in the values of attributes of this object. It is
possible to observe the object leading to input information consisting of ob-
servable properties. On the basis of these properties information on the values
of attributes of the object is derived. This task involves interpretation: inter-
preting observable properties in terms of values of attributes (which may be
diﬃcult or impossible to observe directly).
Two problems occurring often in such classiﬁcation tasks in real-world
domains are underspeciﬁcation and overspeciﬁcation. Underspeciﬁcation oc-
curs when the observations are suﬃcient to exclude some of the values of at-
tributes, but insuﬃcient to determine unique values for each of the attributes:
a range of values may still be possible. Overspeciﬁcation occurs when the ob-
servation information is contradictory: for some of the attributes not any value
is possible. Underspeciﬁcation can lead to an approximation (an upper bound)
of the solution of the classiﬁcation: a set of possibilities, one of which is the
right solution. If the number of observations increases, the approximation may
come closer to a unique solution: the resulting sets of possible classiﬁcations
will decrease with the increase of observation information. Overspeciﬁcation
leads to a trivial approximation from the other direction: the empty set as a
lower bound (no classiﬁcation at all). The combination of underspeciﬁcation
and overspeciﬁcation as occurs often in practical domains is problematic. The
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occurrence of contradictory observation information interferes with the ap-
proximations that can be used as upper bound of the solution.
Multi-interpretation operators can be used to clarify this interference: such
an operator formalizes that there is more than one possibility of interpreting
the observed ﬁndings. A generic multi-interpretation operator is introduced to
formalize such tasks. The input language of the operator is restricted to ob-
servation information only; interpretations of this observation information are
expressed in terms of the output language of the operator. This formalization
identiﬁes and separates the overspeciﬁcation and underspeciﬁcation and entails
an approximate solution of a classiﬁcation problem in the form of multiple
approximations.
One domain in which multi-interpretable observations can be analysed using
a technique based on the distinction of diﬀerent views is the domain of ecology.
Here the possible values of abiotic factors such as moisture and acidity of a
terrain are determined on the basis of the plant species found on the terrain.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces multi-inter-
pretation operators and selection operators and some properties they may
have. The generic multi-interpretation operator for interpreting observation
information is also given and studied in this section. The application of these
techniques in the domain of ecology is brieﬂy sketched in Section 3. In Section
4, it is shown that such a generic operator is representable in default logic. The
last section contains the conclusions.
2. Multi-interpretation operators and approximate classiﬁcation
In this section the notion of multi-interpretation operator is introduced
(Section 2.1), a speciﬁc type of multi-interpretation operator is deﬁned that
formalizes approximate classiﬁcation (Section 2.2), and some properties of this
multi-interpretation operator are proven (Section 2.3).
2.1. Multi-interpretation operators
A multi-interpretation operator is an operator that assigns to each set of
input information, a set of interpretations. The input information is described
by propositional formulae in a propositional language L1. An interpretation is
a set of propositional formulae, which is closed under the standard proposi-
tional consequence operator Cn. Such a closed set will be called a belief set, and
we assume that they are based on a (possibly diﬀerent) propositional language
L2. A belief set can be seen as a possible set of beliefs of an agent with perfect
(propositional) reasoning capabilities.
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Deﬁnition 2.1 (Multi-interpretation operator)
(a) A multi-interpretation operator MI with input language L1 and output lan-
guage L2 is a function MI: PðL1Þ ! PðPðL2ÞÞ that assigns a set of belief
sets to each set of input facts.
(b) A multi-interpretation operator MI satisﬁes non-inclusiveness if for all
X  L1 and all S;T 2MIðXÞ, if S  T then S ¼ T.
(c) The kernel KMI : PðL1Þ ! PðL2Þ of MI is deﬁned by: for all X  L1,
KMIðXÞ ¼
\
MIðXÞ:
(d) If L1  L2, then a multi-interpretation operator MI satisﬁes inclusion if for
all X  L1 and all T 2MIðXÞ it holds X  T.
The condition of non-inclusiveness guarantees a relative maximality of the
possible interpretations. The kernel of a multi-interpretation operator yields
the most certain conclusions given a set of initial facts, namely those which are
in every possible interpretation of the input information. The last condition
expresses conservativity: it means that a possible interpretation of the world at
least satisﬁes the given facts; in this case the multi-interpretation operator
deﬁnes a method of extending partial information. Note that when MIðXÞ has
exactly one element this means that the set X  L1 has a unique interpretation
under MI.
To give an example of a multi-interpretation operator, consider a set of
default rules (the reader is referred to the next section for a deﬁnition of default
logic). A set of initial facts, together with the default rules, gives rise to a
number of extensions (which can be considered belief sets). An operator that
assigns the corresponding set of extensions to each set of initial facts is a multi-
interpretation operator. The kernel of this operator yields the sceptical (see
e.g., [10]) conclusions.
Often, after a number of belief sets have been generated, the reasoning agent
will focus on (or make a commitment to) one (or possibly more) of the belief
sets, because it seems the most promising, or interesting, possible view on the
world. This selection process can be formalized by selection operators (see [5]).
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Selection operator and selective interpretation operator)
(a) A selection operator s is a function s : PðPðLÞÞ ! PðPðLÞÞ that assigns to
each set of belief sets a subset (for all A  PðLÞ it holds sðAÞ  A) such
that whenever A  PðLÞ is non-empty, sðAÞ is non-empty. A selection op-
erator s is single-valued if for all non-empty A the set sðAÞ contains exactly
one element.
(b) A selective interpretation operator for the multi-interpretation operator MI
is a function C : PðL1Þ ! PðL2Þ that assigns a belief set to each set of
facts, such that for all X  L1 it holds CðXÞ 2MIðXÞ.
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It is straightforward to check that if s : PðPðL2ÞÞ ! PðPðL2ÞÞ is a single-
valued selection operator, then a selective interpretation operator C for a
multi-interpretation operator MI can be deﬁned by setting
CðXÞ ¼ sðMIðXÞÞ for all X  L1:
The type of operator described above is very general, and many forms of
reasoning can be captured with it (see [5] for a number of examples described in
terms of belief set operators). Below, we will describe a generic type of operator
applicable for a speciﬁc classiﬁcation task.
2.2. A multi-interpretation operator for approximate classiﬁcation
Suppose we have an object in the real world (a car, for example), and we are
interested in the values of certain attributes of this object (such as the amount
of horsepower of the engine; we assume attributes are functions). All we can do
is observe a number of properties of the object (such as the colour, or maybe
that it is a Ford). Knowledge relating observable properties to the possible
values of attributes is needed to perform this classiﬁcation task. Using this
knowledge, for each attribute certain values can be excluded. In a situation of
underspeciﬁcation for each of the attributes this results in a remaining range of
possible values. However, if also overspeciﬁcation occurs, then in a classical
manner it can be derived that for a certain attribute no value at all is possible,
which contradicts the functional nature of attributes.
A formalization of this approximate classiﬁcation task can be made using
the notions deﬁned above. The language L1 is the propositional language of
which the atoms are the ground atoms deﬁned by the following signature:
The meaning of observedðpiÞ is (not surprisingly) that the property pi has been
observed of the object. A variable over the set Props will be denoted by P.
The language L2 is the propositional language extending L1, of which the
additional atoms are the ground atoms deﬁned by the following signature:
A variable over attributes will be denoted by A, a variable over values will be
denoted by V.
a ﬁnite set Props of property names: p1; . . . ; pk
a unary predicate: observed
a ﬁnite set of attribute names: a1; . . . ; am
a ﬁnite set of values for each of the
attributes: v1;1; . . . ; v1;k1; v2;1; . . . ; vm;km
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Predicates:
is incompatible withðP;A;VÞ
has valueðA;VÞ
is indicativeðPÞ
The basic idea is that certain (observed) properties may rule out certain values
for certain attributes. A fact is incompatible withðP;A;VÞ means that if the
observed object has property P, then the attribute A of the object cannot have
the value V. The predicate has valueðA;VÞ means that attribute A of the object
has value V. The last predicate requires a bit more explanation. The basic
assumption on the domain is that we may have (potentially) many observa-
tions, which can be contradictory. That is, two observed properties may both
rule out values for one attribute, such that together they rule out all possible
values of that attribute. This may happen for a number of reasons. It may be
that our observations are fallible: sometimes we observe a property the object
does not have. It is also possible that our knowledge about which properties
are incompatible with which values of attributes is uncertain or even not
completely correct. Another possibility is that the object is not strictly delin-
eated or strictly homogeneous with respect to its attributes, and some prop-
erties are observed from diﬀerent parts of the object. To deal with this
situation, we may label some observed properties as being indicative. If the
observations are uncertain, ‘indicative’ may simply mean ‘assumed true’. If the
object is not homogeneous, then an indicative property is a property related to
the view on the object we are interested in. The idea is that some properties are
used to infer the values of attributes (in this sense they are ‘indicative’ of these
values), whereas the others are for example wrong, not of interest or coinci-
dental for this view.
There is a knowledge base, KB, in language L2, that consists of proposi-
tional formulae expressing knowledge which is of the following form:
• a (large) number of ground instances of
is incompatible withðP;A;VÞ
These instances represent the experts’ knowledge of which properties rule out
which values of certain attribute values.
• all ground instances of the generic rule
is indicativeðPÞ ^ is incompatible withðP;A;VÞ ! :has valueðA;VÞ
This rule makes it possible to conclude that certain attributes of the object do
not have a certain value. This derivation can be made if an indicative property
has been found that does not (generally) occur in objects for which the at-
tribute A has value V.
• statements expressing that for each attribute at least one value should apply
has valueða1; v1;1Þ _    _ has valueða1; v1;k1Þ
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has valueðam; vm;1Þ _    _ has valueðam; vm;kmÞ
For a given set of observed properties OBS  Props, i.e., input of the form
fobservedðpÞ jp 2 OBSg
the set
X ¼ KB [ fis indicativeðpÞ jp 2 OBSg
may be inconsistent. That is, it may be inconsistent to assume that all observed
properties are indicative for the object. This may occur if there is an attribute A
such that for all of its possible values Vjk, a property P is observed that neg-
atively indicates this value (which means we have both is indicativeðPÞ and
is incompatible withðP;A;VjkÞ). With the generic rule, the conclusion
:has valueðA;Vj;kÞ is drawn for all possible values Vj;k of A. But this is in-
consistent with the statement
has valueðA;Vj;1Þ _    _ has valueðA;Vj;kjÞ
which is in KB. However, the set of maximal indicative subsets consistent with
KB may be considered. This is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Maximal indicative subset)
(a) A set of properties S  Props is an indicative set of properties if the theory
KB [ fis indicativeðpÞ jp 2 Sg
is consistent.
(b) Let OBS  Props be a given set of observed properties. A set S  OBS is a
maximal indicative subset of OBS if it is an indicative set of properties and
for each indicative set of properties T with S  T  OBS it holds S ¼ T.
The set of maximal indicative subsets of OBS is denoted by maxind(OBS).
Note that, since Props is ﬁnite, for each indicative subset S of a set OBS,
there exists at least one maximal indicate subset S0 of OBS such that S  S0.
Moreover, if OBS is an indicative set of properties itself, there is only one
maximal indicative subset of OBS, namely OBS itself.
Based on these notions the following multi-interpretation operator can be
deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Generic multi-interpretation operator for approximate classifica-
tion). For a set X  L1, deﬁne the set of observations implied by X by
OBSðXÞ ¼ fp jobservedðpÞ 2 CnðXÞg:
The operator MImaxind is deﬁned by
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MImaxindðXÞ
¼ fCnðX [ KB [ fis indicativeðpÞ jp 2 SgÞ jS 2 maxindðOBSðXÞÞg
for each X  L1.
Note that X  Y  L1 implies OBSðXÞ  OBSðYÞ. Actually, the sets X will
often be sets of the form fobservedðpÞ jp 2 OBSg for some set of properties
OBS  Props.
2.3. Properties of the generic multi-interpretation operator for approximate
classiﬁcation
The operator MImaxind satisﬁes a number of properties of well-behavedness.
The proofs are rather straightforward.
Proposition 2.5. The multi-interpretation operatorMImaxind satisfies inclusion and
non-inclusiveness.
In [5], some further conditions of well-behavedness for belief set operators
are introduced (generalizing corresponding properties of inference operations,
cf. [8]). These properties can be deﬁned for multi-interpretation operators as
well; a number of them are formulated below.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (Properties of multi-interpretation operators)
(a) Let A, B be sets of belief sets. The set B contains more information than A,
denoted A6B, if for all T 2 B there exists S 2 A such that S  T.
(b) Let MI be a multi-interpretation operator.
MI satisﬁes belief monotony if for all X;Y  L1:
X  Y ) MIðXÞ6MIðYÞ:
(c) Let MI be a multi-interpretation operator for which L1  L2.
1. MI satisﬁes weak belief monotony if for all X;Y  L1:
X  Y  KMIðXÞ ) MIðXÞ6MIðYÞ:
2. MI satisﬁes belief transitivity if for all X;Y;T  L1:
T 2MIðXÞ & X  Y  T ) KMIðYÞ  T
3. MI satisﬁes belief cut if for all X;Y  L1:
X  Y  KMIðXÞ ) MIðYÞ6MIðXÞ:
Apart from belief monotony (which should in general not be expected), our
multi-interpretation operator is well-behaved.
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Theorem 2.7. The multi-interpretation operator MImaxind satisfies weak belief
monotony, belief transitivity and belief cut. It does not generally satisfy belief
monotony.
Proof. Abbreviate MImaxind to MI. Starting with belief monotony, consider a
situation in which we have two properties, P1 and P2 (for simplicity), and
suppose KB contains information which prevents P1 and P2 of both being
indicative at the same time: there is an attribute A which has possible values 0
and 1. This means thatKB contains the formula has valueðA; 0Þ _ has valueðA; 1Þ.
Furthermore, suppose that we have is incompatible with ðP1;A; 0Þ and
is incompatible withðP2;A; 1Þ in KB. Now let
X ¼ fobservedðP1Þg;
Y ¼ fobservedðP1Þ; observedðP2Þg:
Then MI(X) contains one element (in which P1 is indicative), and MIðYÞ
contains two elements, one in which only P1 is indicative, and one in which
only P2 is indicative. For this latter element there is no smaller set in MI(X).
Therefore, belief monotony does not hold.
Let us now consider weak belief monotony and belief cut. Suppose X 
Y  KMIðXÞ and let T 2MIðXÞ, then
T ¼ CnðX [ KB [ fis indicativeðpÞ jp 2MgÞ
for some M 2 maxindðOBSðXÞÞ and Y  T (since Y  KMIðXÞ). But as X and
Y contain only the predicate observed which is not present in KB or in
fis indicativeðpÞ jp 2Mg, it must be the case that CnðYÞ  CnðXÞ, so that
CnðXÞ ¼ CnðYÞ. This implies that MIðXÞ ¼MIðYÞ, proving both weak belief
monotony and belief cut.
If T 2MIðXÞ & X  Y  T, then the same argument shows that
MIðXÞ ¼MIðYÞ, from which immediately follows that KMIðYÞ ¼ KMIðXÞ  T.
This proves belief transitivity. 
Each of the belief sets is an approximation in the sense of an upper bound of
the solution. If the number of observations increases, this upper bound de-
creases, as is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.8. For each pair of subsets X;Y  L1 the following holds:
X  Y ) for all S 2MIðXÞ there exists a T 2MIðYÞ such that S  T:
Proof. From X  Y it follows OBSðXÞ  OBSðYÞ (see note just below Deﬁ-
nition 2.4) Therefore every maximal indicative subset of OBS(X) is an indi-
cative subset S of OBS(Y). Within OBS(Y) this indicative subset can be
extended to a maximal indicative subset S0 (see note just below Deﬁnition 2.3).
This implies the theorem. 
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This theorem guarantees that an increasing sequence of observations
X0  X1  X2    
results in increasing beliefs sets within the sets MIðXiÞ. These increasing belief
sets correspond to decreasing sets of classiﬁcations, i.e., for each of the in-
creasing belief sets the ranges of the possible values of attributes are decreasing:
this provides an approximation of the classiﬁcation by a sequence of decreasing
upper bounds.
Note that Theorem 2.8 leaves open the possibility that belief sets remain
constant, or new belief sets arise in some stage, i.e., sets of which no sub-set
occurs in the previous set of belief sets. In general, for a given sequence of
observations the resulting belief sets will form a set of trees as depicted in
Fig. 1. Here
MIðX0Þ ¼ fS0g;
MIðX1Þ ¼ fS11;S12;S13g;
MIðX2Þ ¼ fS211;S212;S221;S231;S232g:
The following proposition covers the case of an observed set of properties
OBS which has a unique interpretation.
Proposition 2.9. For each subset of properties OBS  Props, the following are
equivalent:
i(i) MImaxindðfobservedðpÞ jp 2 OBSgÞ contains just one element;
(ii) the set OBS is an indicative set of properties.
Fig. 1. Example approximate classiﬁcations based on an increasing sequence of observations.
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If these (equivalent) conditions are satisﬁed, all observed properties are in-
dicative, and there are no alternative interpretations. This means there is no
need for further selection from alternatives. The possible values of the attri-
butes are contained in MImaxindðfobservedðpÞ jp 2 OBSgÞ.
IfMImaxindðfobservedðpÞ jp 2 OBSgÞ contains more than one element, then a
further selection process can be started. But even before this selection process,
conclusions can be drawn: the kernel of theMImaxind operator contains the most
certain conclusions, so KMImaxindðfobservedðpÞ jp 2 OBSgÞ may be inspected.
For instance, there may be two possible views in MImaxindðfobservedðpÞ jp 2
OBSgÞ due to the fact that there is an attribute A1 for which no value is
compatible with all the observed properties. However, all of these properties
may indicate that another attribute A2 must have a certain value, and this
conclusion will be in KMImaxindðfobservedðpÞ jp 2 OBSgÞ. If A2 is all one is in-
terested in, there is no need for selection. If one is interested also in A1, this
selection has to take place. If one is interested in the properties which are in-
dicative in both maximal indicative sets, one can either examine
KMImaxindðfobservedðpÞ jp 2 OBSgÞ, or the intersection of the maximal indicative
sets:
KMImaxindðXÞ \ fis indicativeðpÞ jp 2 Pg
¼ is indicativeðpÞ jp 2
\
maxindðOBSðXÞÞ
n o
:
For the multi-interpretation operator MImaxind, the language and the format
(the kinds of rules) of the knowledge base KB were ﬁxed. When the language
and format of KB is left open, we get a general class of multi-interpretation
operators that can deal with input which is contradictory in the sense that it is
inconsistent with a knowledge base.
3. An example application
In this section we will brieﬂy describe a domain to which the formalization
above was applied (see [1]). Nature conservationists are interested in a number
of so-called abiotic factors of terrains. These factors, examples of which are the
moisture, acidity and nutrient value, give an indication of how healthy a terrain
is. As these factors are diﬃcult to measure directly, a sample of plant species
growing on a terrain is taken.
For each species, the experts have knowledge about the possible values of
the abiotic factors of a terrain on which the species lives. So it may be known,
for example, that a certain species can only live on medium to very acid ter-
rains. Combining such knowledge for each of the plant species observed on a
terrain leads to conclusions about the abiotic factors of the terrain.
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During the development of a knowledge-based system, EKS, to automate
this classiﬁcation process, however, it turned out that the samples of species
taken were often incompatible (e.g., see the sample depicted in Table 1). That
is, there was at least one abiotic factor for which no value could be found that
was permissible for all species. This is not due to errors in the knowledge of
abiotic factors needed by species to live, but due to other eﬀects. For example,
a terrain may lie on the transition of a dry and a wet piece of land. Some of the
observed species may occur on the drier, and others on the wetter side. This can
also be due to the presence of ponds in an otherwise dry terrain. Also transi-
tions of a terrain over time, or vertical inhomogeneity may be causes.
The approximate classiﬁcation task described above is an example of the
task performed by the multi-interpretation operator MImaxind. The object to be
studied is a terrain, and the attributes of interest are the abiotic factors. The
presence of certain species are the observable properties of the object. So we
can specialize the generic knowledge base to this case. The language is as
follows:
The experts’ knowledge about the possible values of abiotic factors for a
species, is formalized by (a large number of) instances of the predicate is_in-
compatible withðP;A;VÞ, where P is one of the plant species names, A is an
abiotic factor, and V is a value of that factor. This knowledge leads to a speciﬁc
instantiation of MImaxind, we will denote by the same name. The alternative
interpretations given by MImaxindðXÞ are extremely useful. Each of the alter-
natives leads to a diﬀerent set of (possible) values for the abiotic factors. If this
is for instance due to the fact that the terrain consists of a drier portion and a
wetter portion, then a selection can be made for the portion of interest, whose
possible values for abiotic factors are contained in the corresponding inter-
pretation. This selection process can be formalized by a selection operator as
deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2.2. At this moment, that process has not been analyzed
in more detail, but that is one of the future directions of research.
As mentioned before, a system called EKS has been developed to help a user
in establishing the abiotic factors of a terrain. The correspondence between the
formalization of the expert reasoning task and the interactive knowledge-based
properties: (occurrence of) plant species
names
achillea millefolium,
achillea ptarmica; . . .
attributes: abiotic factors moisture, acidity,
nutrient value
values for each of the attributes abiotic
factors:
very dry; fairly dry; . . . ;
basic; neutral; . . . ;
nutrient poor;
fairly nutrient rich; 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Table 1
Maximal indicative subsets within an inhomogeneous sample of plant species
Moisture: (vd: very dry, fd: fairly dry, fm: fairly moist, vm: very moist, fw: fairly wet, vw: very wet).
Acidity: (bas: basis, neu: neutral, sac: slightly acid, fac: fairly acid, ac: acid).
Nutrient value: (np: nutrient poor, fnr: fairly nutrient rich, nr: nutrient rich, vnr: very nutrient rich).
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system EKS that models the approximate classiﬁcation task is as follows (see
Fig. 2).
The ﬁrst component of the system, determination of maximal indicative
subsets, is formalized by the belief set operator MImaxind deﬁned in Section 2.2.
The second component of the system, selection of a maximal indicative subset,
which models (an interface to) the selection process by the user of the system, is
formalized by a single-valued selection function suser.
The composition CEKS of MImaxind and suser deﬁned by
CEKSðXÞ ¼ suserðMImaxindðXÞÞ for X  L1
is a selective interpretation operator for MImaxind (as described in Deﬁnition
2.2(b)). This operator formalizes the reasoning of the system in interaction with
the user as a whole. Note that from the two functions of which this overall
function is composed, one is ﬁxed and deﬁned by the system itself (i.e.,
MImaxind), whereas the other can be changed dynamically, depending on the
user (i.e., suser). For more details on this application, see [1].
4. Representation in default logic
Section 2.2 described the generic multi-interpretation operator MI, which
formalizes the interpretation of (possibly inconsistent) observation information
using maximal indicative sets. A speciﬁcation of this multi-interpretation op-
erator in a (well-known) logical formalism would mean that known results
about this logic can be applied to this situation, but it would also allow for the
use of proof mechanisms for this logic to be used in an implemented system
based on such an operator. In [6,9] default logic is used as a speciﬁcation
language for families of belief sets. These results can be applied to the for-
malization presented in Section 2.2.
Fig. 2. Correspondence between the formalization and the system.
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To start, a brief overview of Reiter’s default logic (cf. [2,11]) is provided.
Although Reiter’s deﬁnitions are stated for any ﬁrst-order language, here they
are restricted to propositional logic, as is commonly done. So let us again
assume a propositional language L. A default rule (or default) is an expression
of the form ða : b1; . . . ; bnÞ=c where a; b1; . . . ; bn and c are propositional for-
mulae. Intuitively such a default rule means: if a is believed and it is not in-
consistent to assume b1 through bn, then assume c. A default theory D is then a
pair hW;Di with W a set of sentences (the axioms of D) and D a set of default
rules. The default rules are used to extend the axioms to a (larger) set of for-
mulas, called an extension. The following deﬁnition of the notion of extension
is slightly diﬀerent but equivalent to Reiter’s original deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Reiter extension). Let D ¼ hW;Di be a default theory. A set of
sentences E is called a Reiter extension of D if the following condition is sat-
isﬁed:
E ¼
[
i¼0
Ei;
where
E0 ¼ CnðWÞ;
and for all iP 0,
Eiþ1 ¼ CnðEi[fx j ða : b1; . . . ; bnÞ=x 2 D;
a 2 Ei and :b1 62 E; . . . ;:bn 62 EgÞ:
The set of Reiter extensions of D is denoted by ExtðDÞ.
Extensions of a default theory are closed under propositional provability, so
ExtðDÞ is a family of belief sets. In a sense, this family is represented (or
speciﬁed) by D. For an arbitrary family of belief sets, the question can be posed
whether it can be represented by a default theory.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Representability of a family of belief sets). Let D ¼ hW;Di be a
default theory. A family of belief sets F is representable by D if ExtðDÞ ¼ F. The
family F is called representable by a default theory if there exists such a default
theory.
In [9] the following theorem has been proven (Corollary 5.2).
Theorem 4.3. A family F of theories is representable by a normal default theory if
and only if F¼ {L} or there is a consistent set of formulas W and a set of for-
mulas C such that
F ¼ fCnðW [UÞ jU is a maximal subset of C consistent with Wg:
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In [6] the question is posed whether a belief set operator can be represented
by a set of defaults. Below, the deﬁnitions in that paper are slightly generalized
to deal with a diﬀerent input and output language. Recall that L1 is the input
language, and L2 is the output language. We make the assumption that
L1  L2.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Representability of a multi-interpretation operator). Let D ¼
hW;Di be a default theory. A multi-interpretation operatorMI is representable
by D, if for all X  L1 it holds that MIðXÞ ¼ ExtðhW [ X;DiÞ. The operator
MI is called representable by a default theory if there exists such a default
theory.
Consider the family of belief sets MImaxindðXÞ where X  L1. Then Theorem
4.3 can be applied to MImaxindðXÞ by setting:
W ¼ X [ KB
C ¼ fis indicativeðpÞ jp 2 OBSðXÞg
with KB as deﬁned in Section 2.2. Now Theorem 4.3 implies that for each
X  L1 there exists a normal default theory that represents the belief sets of
MImaxindðXÞ. The theorem does not imply that there exists one set of defaults
D which works for all sets X  L1, so this does not imply that the multi-
interpretation operator MImaxind is representable by a default theory. However,
the normal default theory can actually be found by deﬁning the following
generic set of defaults D:
ðobservedðpÞ : is indicativeðpÞÞ=is indicativeðpÞ for all properties p in Props:
This set of defaults is independent of X, so MImaxind is representable using the
above set of defaults D and the KB of Section 2.2.
Theorem 4.5. The multi-interpretation operator MImaxind is representable by the
normal default theory hKB;Di.
Proof. Let X be a set of formulas in L1. Let X [ KB be consistent (if it is
not, veriﬁcation is straightforward and omitted). The extensions of hKB [ X;
Di are sets of the form CnðKB [ X [ SÞ, where S is a subset of fis indicativeðpÞj
observedðpÞ 2 CnðXÞg, which is maximal such that CnðKB [ X [ SÞ is consis-
tent. This is proved below. The sets CnðKB [ X [ SÞ with S as above together
comprise MImaxindðXÞ.
First of all, let S be such a maximal set, and let E ¼ CnðKB [ X [ SÞ. Then if
the Ei are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 4.1, the following holds:
E0 ¼ CnðKB [ XÞ;
E1 ¼ CnðE0 [ fis indicativeðpÞ jobservedðpÞ 2 E0;:is indicativeðpÞ 62 EgÞ:
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As E1 does not contain more instances of the observed predicate than E0 (this
follows from the fact that X contains only the observed predicate, whereas KB
does not), Ei ¼ E1 for all i > 1. The claim is that
fis indicativeðpÞ jobservedðpÞ 2 E0;:is indicativeðpÞ 62 Eg ¼ S:
Suppose observedðpÞ 2 E0 and :is indicativeðpÞ 62 E. Then observed(p) is in
Cn(X) and CnðKB [ X [ S [ fis indicativeðpÞgÞ is consistent. But as S was
maximal with respect to these properties, is indicativeðpÞ 2 S. On the other
hand, if is indicativeðpÞ 2 S, then observedðpÞ 2 E0 and :is indicativeðpÞ 62 E
(as E ¼ CnðKB [ X [ SÞ is consistent).
Now let E be an extension of hKB [ X;Di, then it is of the form CnðKB[
X [ SÞ, where S contains (only) formulas of the form is indicative(p). Examin-
ation of KB (and the restriction on the language of X) shows that only if
observedðpÞ 2 CnðXÞ is is indicativeðpÞ 2 E. As extensions are always consistent
(if each rule has a justiﬁcation and the axioms are consistent), CnðKB [ X [ SÞ
must be consistent. Suppose there exists a T  S (strict inclusion) respecting
the conditions, then there must be a default rule observedðpÞ : is indicative
ðpÞ=is indicativeðpÞ, with observedðpÞ 2 CnðXÞ  E and CnðKB [ X [ S[
fis indicativeðpÞgÞ consistent, implying that :is indicativeðpÞ 62 E. But that
means there is an applicable default rule for which the conclusion is not in E,
contradicting the assumption that E is an extension. Therefore S must be
maximal. 
At this point the reader may wonder what the beneﬁt is of the representation
in default logic. The multi-interpretation operator MImaxind arose during the
analysis and formalization of the application described in the previous section.
The system, EKS, was designed and implemented based on this operator
MImaxind. The implementation in fact follows the deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 2.4)
rather closely. The results of the current section indicate that alternatively a
theorem prover for default logic (or, rather, a program computing extensions
of default theories) could be used. A highly optimised theorem prover for
default logic obviates the need to optimise this part of the system ourselves.
This is the subject of current work on the system.
5. Discussion
In most real-life classiﬁcation problems, the information about the object to
be classiﬁed can be interpreted in diﬀerent ways. In this paper, multi-inter-
pretation operators were introduced to formalize this interpretation process. In
particular, observation results of the world may underspecify or overspecify a
classiﬁcation. Overspeciﬁcation means that the observations are in contradic-
tion with knowledge about the world. A generic multi-interpretation operator
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was introduced for approximate classiﬁcation tasks where attribute values of
an object are determined on the basis of imperfect interpretation of observable
properties of the object. The multi-interpretation operator formalizes in a neat
manner the diﬀerent variants of approximate classiﬁcations of the object. This
operator is rather well-behaved, and can be represented by a default theory.
This can be a basis for the use of (highly optimized) theorem provers for de-
fault logic, to implement a system formalized by the multi-interpretation op-
erator. For the domain of ecological classiﬁcation an application for the theory
has been developed, and the resulting system, EKS, that has been implemented
has shown to be a useful tool for nature conservationists.
After multiple interpretations of observation information have been iden-
tiﬁed, often a choice is made for one of them. Which view is (or which views
are) most appropriate presumably requires additional heuristic (strategic)
knowledge (cf. [3,4,12]). One of the areas of future research is to further an-
alyze this choice process, in general terms, but also in particular for the
knowledge-based system. Future research will focus on the acquisition of this
knowledge to be able to support users in the selection process.
Acknowledgements
Within the EKS-project (funded by IPTS and Staatsbosbeheer) a number of
persons have contributed their expertise: Frank Cornelissen, Edgar Vonk
(scientiﬁc programmers); Christine Bel, Rineke Verbrugge (for parts of the
analysis of the domain); Bert Hennipman and Frits van Beusekom (domain
experts from IPTS); Piet Schipper, and Wim Zeeman (domain experts from
Staatsbosbeheer).
References
[1] F.M.T. Brazier, J. Engelfriet, J. Treur, Analysis of multi-interpretable ecological monitoring
information, in: A. Hunter, S. Parsons (Eds.), Applications of Uncertainty Formalisms,
Lecture Notes in AI, vol. 1455, Springer Verlag, 1998, pp. 303–324. Extended version in:
Applied Artiﬁcial Intelligence Journal 16 (2002) 51–71.
[2] P. Besnard, An Introduction to Default Logic, Springer-Verlag, 1989.
[3] G. Brewka, Adding priorities and speciﬁcity to default logic, in: C. MacNish, D. Pearce, L.M.
Pereira (Eds.), Logics in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Proceedings of the JELIA-94, Lecture Notes in
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, vol. 838, Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 247–260.
[4] G. Brewka, Reasoning about Priorities in Default Logic, in: Proceedings of the AAAI-94,
1994.
[5] J. Engelfriet, H. Herre, J. Treur, Nonmonotonic reasoning with multiple belief sets, Annals of
Mathematics and Artiﬁcial Intelligence 24 (1998) 225–248. Preliminary version in: D.M.
Gabbay, H.J. Ohlbach (Eds.), Practical Reasoning, Proceedings FAPR’96, Lecture Notes in
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, vol. 1085, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp. 331–344.
60 J. Engelfriet, J. Treur / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 32 (2003) 43–61
[6] J. Engelfriet, V.W. Marek, J. Treur, M. Truszczynski, Default logic and speciﬁcation of
nonmonotonic reasoning, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical AI 13 (2001) 99–112.
Preliminary version in: J.J. Alferes, L.M. Pereira, E.Orlowska (Eds.), Logics in Artiﬁcial
Intelligence, Proceedings of the Fourth European Workshop on Logics in AI, JELIA’96,
Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, vol. 1126, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp. 224–236.
[7] W. Hodges, Model Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
[8] D. Makinson, General patterns in nonmonotonic reasoning, in: D.M. Gabbay, C.J. Hogger,
J.A. Robinson (Eds.), Handbook of Logic in Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Logic Programming,
vol. 3, Oxford Science Publications, 1994, pp. 35–110.
[9] V.W. Marek, J. Treur, M. Truszczynski, Representation theory for default logic, Annals of
Mathematics and Artiﬁcial Intelligence 21 (1997) 343–358.
[10] V.W. Marek, M. Truszczynski, Nonmonotonic logics; context-dependent reasoning, Springer-
Verlag, 1993.
[11] R. Reiter, A logic for default reasoning, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 13 (1980) 81–132.
[12] Y.-H. Tan, J. Treur, Constructive default logic and the control of defeasible reasoning, in: B.
Neumann (Ed.), Proceedings of the European Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, ECAI’92,
John Wiley, 1992, pp. 299–303.
J. Engelfriet, J. Treur / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 32 (2003) 43–61 61
